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Abstract:We analyze a two-period contest in which agents may become bank-
rupt at the end of the first period. A bankrupt agent is excluded from the contest
in the second period of the game. We investigate the existence of a subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. We distinguish between a borrowing
equilibrium in which at least one agent might be bankrupted and a non borrow-
ing equilibrium in which no agent is bankrupted. We prove that the former
occurs when the agent taking loans is relatively poor and the future does not
mater very much. This action represents the Despair Efect, in which severely
handicapped agents take actions that jeopardize their existence in the long run
but are currently helpful. We find conditions under which borrowing and non
borrowing equilibria overlap and do not overlap. We provide an example in
which no equilibrium exists.
Keywords:dynamic contest, bankruptcy
JEL classification:C72, D72, D74
1 Introduction
The theory of contests studies conflicts in which agents expend efort to obtain a
prize. In static contests, aggregate efort is maximized when agents are identical.
If I play tennis against Nadal, I wil expend very litle efort -because my chances
of winning are very smal- and Nadal wil expend very litle efort because he
does not need much efort to defeat me. In dynamic contests, this situation
translates into theDiscouragement Efect, where lagging players expend litle
efort or throw in the towel -because they wil lose with a high probability- and
players with a large advantage expend litle efort because they do not need
much to win (see Konrad (2012) and references therein).
*Corresponding author: Carmen Beviá,Universidad de Alicante, Alicante, Spain,
E-mail: Carmen.bevia@gmail.com
Luis C. Corchón,
1
Universidad Carlos II de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
However, in some dynamic contests, the contrary may occur. Suppose that in
the Champions League, a soccer team, after losing in the first half of the first
round, is ofered a drug that wil increase their performance in the second half,
but, with some probability the drug wil be discovered and the team disqualified.
If the losing team is defeated by, say 1–0, it might reject the ofer on the grounds
that it is too risky. However, if the team is losing 3–0, it might accept the drug
because the chances that it can overturn the result without extra help are slim.
The result wil be more efort by both teams in the second half of the game. Thus,
heterogeneity in players may increase the aggregate efort, at least in some
periods. We cal this situation theDespair Efectbecause losers may find it optimal
to take risky actions that would not be sensible if their chances were higher.
In this paper, we present a two-period complete information contest in
which two agents are endowed with money and can get extra money in a capital
market.1Potential lenders can invest either in the safe asset or in a contestant.
The later is risky because if this contestant does not win, the investors obtain no
return. The capital market equalizes the expected returns of both assets. Agents
with shalow pockets may overcome this handicap by raising loans and compet-
ing on more equal terms with agents with deep pockets. This is a very stylized
picture of wars among empires and repeated competition among firms for
procurement (aircraft in the US Navy or construction firms).2
A crucial assumption of our model is that a contestant unable to repay the loan
wil be excluded in the second-period contest. This assumption is an idealization of
the problems faced by a country or a firm that is unable to repay its debts. It has been
microfoundated by Bolton and Scharfstein(1990) in a strategic finance setup and
used by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) in their analysis of sovereign debt, in which a
country that refuses to repay faces an embargo on future loans. In the next section,
we discuss this assumption. For the time being let us recal Mr. Micawber’sfamous,
and often quoted, recipe for happiness (see Dickens (1850):
Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen [pounds] nineteen [shilings]
and six [pence], result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure
twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.
This is explained by the fact that, in the novel, the slightest debt wil put the
debtor in jail, no mater how smal. Another example of our assumption is the
1See Brander and Lewis (1988) for a study of the role of financial constraints and bankruptcy in
a duopoly. Gale and Che (1997) also consider budget constrained contestants, but they do not
consider bankruptcy.
2The initial motivation for this research came from a statement of Sir Norman Foster in the film
“How much does your building weigh, Mr. Foster?”
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About the dire straits sufered by his studio
before they were awarded the HSBC Hong Kong building.
recent FIFA proposal to enforce a budget balance among al of the clubs that play
European competitions. To play, clubs must prove that they have no outstanding
payments to players, to each other or to the tax authorities (Franck 2014).
We distinguish between two scenarios. In the first, one of the agents (the
rich agent) has a very large money endowments, so he never takes a loan and
never faces the risk of liquidation. The other agent (the poor agent) has a limited
money endowment, he might get a loan, so he either wins the contest or faces
liquidation. We cal this scenario Rich Man-Poor Man. We prove that the pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this game is unique and
can be of two, mutualy exclusive, types:3
1. Non borrowing equilibrium: The poor agent finances his expenses entirely
with his endowments.
2. Borrowing equilibrium: The poor agent finances part of his expenses in the
capital market.
In the non borrowing equilibrium both agents spend less than in the standard one
shot Nash equilibrium (NE). In the borrowing equilibrium, both agents spend more
than in the one shot NE. The later is an example of the despair efect at work. It also
has predatory features because the rich agent spends a large quantity of money that
drags the poor agent into borrowing, which, given the risk of bankruptcy for the
later, increases the expected prize received by the rich agent in the second period.
As a consequence, the extent of rent dissipation depends on which equilibrium
occurs and might exceed or fal short of that in the standard one shot NE.
The (non) borrowing equilibrium exists when the poor agent is (resp., is not)
very poor and does not care (resp., does care) much about the future. The role of
the discount is clear: if an agent does not care much about the future, the risk of
bankruptcy has smal payof consequences, so he is inclined to obtain a loan.
The role of the endowment is where the Despair Efect comes into the picture. A
loan alows the poor agent to compete on equal footing with the rich agent.
When both agents have similar monetary endowments, a loan does not mean
much to the poor agent, in terms of helping him to compete in the first period,
and it brings a risky outcome.4We also show that for intermediate values of the
poor agent’s endowment and the discount rate, a SPNE may not exist.
3For tractability reasons, the analysis in this paper is restricted to the case of pure strategies.
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Our results can be interpreted in terms of endogenous time preference (Becker and Muligan
1997). In our case, the rich man is an endogenously more patient player, because he runs a
smaler risk of bankruptcy, thereby having a beter prospect of surviving until the second period
to claim the prize. Therefore bankruptcy adds to the standard determinant of time preference
like wealth, mortality, addiction and uncertainty.
In the second scenario, both agents are identical, have limited endow-
ments, and may access the capital market. We cal this scenario Poor Man-Poor
Man. This scenario is meant to capturethe polar situation to the previous
section and to see the impact of deep pockets on the equilibrium outcome.
Now we have two equilibria: one in which neither agent borrows and another
in which both agents borrow. We show that these equilibria have properties
that match those in the Rich Man-Poor Man scenario except that here both
equilibria can coexist. The borrowing equilibrium is an example of the despair
efect afecting both players. In this case we have double predation, where
both contestants go to the end of their tether in an efort to ruin the opponent.
This shows that predation is not caused by deep pocket but by the competitive
nature of our game.
Our paper is related to other papers in which the result of early rounds
may encourage contestants to make greater eforts. Garfinkel and Skaperdas
(2000) study the efect of war on pacification in subsequent periods. Sela (2011)
considers a race in which the loser cares about the magnitude of the defeat
and shows that the loser of the first batle may be encouraged to increase efort
in the second batle to avoid dishonorable defeat. Möler (2012) and Beviá and
Corchón (2013) consider two-period contests where prizes won in earlier peri-
ods improve the players’abilities or the probability of success in the second
contest. Because winning in the first round has a positive impact on the
outcome in the second round, players have an extra incentive to make an
efort. Consequently, the discouragement efect holds only when the diference
between players is suficiently large. Another strand of dynamic contests
studies contests with several rounds and where contestants are eliminated at
each round, see the pioneering paper by Rosen (1986) and Fu and Lu (2012) for
a recent entry and further references. Examples of these situations are promo-
tions inside the firm, sports, the Oscars…The diference with our approach is
that we do not require elimination. Elimination may or may not occur in our
model depending on the equilibrium of the game. Thus in our model“money
talks”.
The Despair Efect considered in our paper difers from the literature above
in that an efort today might bring disastrous consequences in the future.
Examples of this efect abound in military history from the dictum“caja o
faja”(cofin or belt, a military regalia only wore by marshals), which refers to
the low rank oficers commanding almost suicidal atacks that, in the case of
success bring large promotions, to batles such as Leite Gulf in 1944, in which
the Japanese navy commited almost al of their available ships to defend
crucial oil supply lines to Japan. Similarly, at the end of Spain’smasteryin
Europe (1635), Spain engaged in“an al or nothing”
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war with France that
almost succeeded (Corteguera 2002, 143). Finaly, the famous dictum in the
“Communist Manifesto”(1848),“the proletarians have nothing to lose but their
chains. They have a world to win”may be interpreted as another example. The
Despair Efect also arises in long-distance running, where a wel-known tactic
for lagging runners is to make a extraordinary efort to catch up the leaders.
Many times this large efort forces the athlete to abandon the race, but in some
cases it pays of.
The rest of the paper proceeds as folows. Section 2 describes the model.
The Rich Man-Poor Man and the Poor Man-Poor Man scenarios are analyzed in
Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 closes with some final comments.
2 The Model
There are two periods and two agents, also caled contestants and denoted asa
andb. In each periodtagents contest for a prize of valueVby spending a
quantity of a resource that we cal money and denote byGtiwherei2fa,bg.In
period one agentiis endowed withMiunits of money. Without loss of generality
we assume thatMa≥Mb.IfG1i>Miagentican borrow from a credit market where
money can be invested either in financing the contestants or in a riskless asset
that, after a period, yieldsrunits per unit investment. The interest rateris
determined exogenously. An investment of a unit of money in the expenses
made by contestantiyieldsswith probabilitypi(which is the probability thati
wins the contest) and 0 with probability 1−pi(which is the probability thati
loses the contest). Assuming that investors are risk neutral, the expected return
ispis. If the capital market is competitive, we should have
pis=r. [2:1]
Thus, if the“risky”investment is a safe deal,piﬃ1 andsﬃr. When the risky
investment is very risky,piﬃ0 andsﬃ∞.
Let us now write the expected payofs of contestantiwho fuly financedG1i
units of money through the capital market and spent them in the contest. With
probabilitypiit winsVbut it must paysG1i. With probability 1−pi, it loses and
has no money to pay. Thus, the expected profits for contestantiare
piV−pisG1i=piV−rG1i. [2:2]
If the expenses are financed with the endowments, they have an opportunity
cost ofr. In any case, eq. [2.2] represents the payof of contestanti. In the rest of
the paper, without loss of generality, we setr
5
=1.
In each period there are three stages defined as folows:
1. Agents decide on the amount of expenses.
If this amount exceeds the available money, they borrow the diference, i.e.
if agentispendsG1i>Mihe can borrowG1i−Miin the credit market.5
2. The prize is awarded.
Letptibe the probability that agentiobtains the prize in periodt. For
simplicity we wil assume that the probability of winning the contest is
given by a Tulock Contest Success Function (CSF).
piðGti,GtjÞ= G
ti
Gti+Gtj,i,j2fa,bg,i≠j. [2:3]
3. Bankruptcy rules. If the agent was in debt and did not win the prize, no
one wants to lend him any more money, so he is excluded from the contest
in period 2.
This assumption is, of course, an idealization. Couwenberg (2001) finds that the
survival rate of firms after bankruptcy is 18% in the US, 20% in the UK and 6%
in France. Countries may fal into several bankruptcies before they are out of the
world domination game: The Spanish Habsburgs became bankrupt in 1557, 1576,
1596 and 1607 before the bankruptcies that sealed their fate in 1647 and 1653.
France, bankrupt at the eve of French revolution in 1789, enjoyed an enviable
position in European afairs until 1813. In both cases, however, bankruptcies had
serious consequences on the role of these nations.6Even near bankruptcies,
such as Scotland in 1707, Great Britain in 1945, and Russia in the 1990s, paved
the way for the reduced visibility of these nations in subsequent years. In fact,
Paul Kennedy (1987) argues that financial overburden, caused by overexpansion
in strategic commitments, is the primary cause of the decline of empires. We
take this view to the limit, assuming that bankrupted nations disappear from the
contest arena. Furthermore, some countries and companies preclude bankrupt
agents from procurement (see Chapter 15 of US government procurement). A
simple justification of this procedures is that they are a crude way of dealing
with the free-rider problem that would arise if bankruptcy were folowed by debt
renegotiation.
5We assume that an agent’s borrowing decision cannot be observed by her rival. This
assumption seems to us plausible and makes the model simpler than assuming otherwise.
6Cruces and Trebesch (2012) construct a database of investor losses in al restructurings of
sovereign debt from 1970 until 2010, covering 180 cases in 68 countries and find that“high
creditor losses are associated with…longer periods of market exclusion.
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We say that an agent isactivein the second period if he can participate in
the contest. If an agent loses the contest in the first period, he wil be active in
the second period ifG1i≤Mi. Note that if an agent wins the contests she can
repay the loan since no maximizing agent wil ever bid more that the value of
the prize.
Finaly, we assume that:
4. Second period. If there is only one active agent in this period, this agent
wins the prize at no cost.7If there are no active agents, the prize is not
awarded. If two agents are active, they compete as in the first period. If an
agent cannot repay the loan, this has no consequences because the world
ends in this period. Therefore, in the second period, if both agents are
active, they spend equal amounts and obtain the same payof, which we
denote byπ.
In periodt, the expected payof of agentiis
πti=piðGti,GtjÞV−Gti. [2:4]
The expected payof for agentifor the entire game is denoted byπiand defined as
πi=π1i+δπ2i [2:5]
whereδ2ð0, 1is the discount rate, common to both agents.
Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibriumðSPNEÞ. Given
this, al the relevant action occurs in period one. Consequently, we focus our
analysis on the variables in this period and we drop the superindexes from now
on. ThusG1i=Gi, etc.
In the next section, we focus on the case in which agentacan pay out any
conceivable expense from his endowments, but agentbcannot. We wil cal this
case“Rich Man-Poor Man”. The case in which both agents are constrained
(“Poor Man-Poor Man”) is analyzed in the subsequent section.
3 Rich Man-Poor Man Scenario
In this section, we assume that agenta-the rich agent- has a very large quantity of
money so that he wil never be constrained, and agentb-the poor agent- does not.
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In the final section we discuss the possibility that a bankrupted agent is replaced in the
second period by a fresh agent.
Consider a game in which the payof functions areπaandπb(see 2.4) and
there are no financial constraints. We cal the Nash equilibrium of this game the
one shot Nash equilibrium. Under our assumptions, this equilibrium is given by
Ga=Gb=π=V4 [3:1]
whereGis the expense of an agent in the one shot Nash equilibrium andπis the
one shot Nash equilibrium payofs.
We assume that the poor agent cannot finance Gout of his pocket, i.e.
Mb<G. Consequently, the poor agent must decide whether he wants to borrow.
This case corresponds to the“deep pocket”case, which has been considered in
oligopolistic markets; see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and the references
therein. It has been argued that deep pockets yield predation. We consider the
validity of such a conclusion in our set up.
There are two possible types of equilibria of the dynamic game: those
in which the poor agent does not borrow -equilibrium without borrowing-
and those in which the poor agent does borrow–equilibrium with borrowing.
We start with the case in which the poor agent does not borrow in equilibrium.
Note first that if agentbis constrained,Mb<V=4. To show the existence of a
non borrowing equilibrium, we must show thatGb=Mband the best reply to this
expense by agent a,Ga= VMbp −Mb, is an equilibrium. The payof of the poor
agent if he does not borrow is:
πNBb = MbMb+GaV−Mb+δ
V
4= MbV
p −Mb+δV4=Ga+δ
V
4. [3:2]
If he deviates and decides to borrow, he wil risk bankruptcy but wil increase
his probability of winning in the first period. Then, his continuation payof is
πBb=pbV−^Gb+δpbV4 =pb V+δ
V
4 −^Gb [3:3]
where G^b= V 1+14δGa
s
−Ga, andpb= G^bG^b+Ga
. [3:4]
A non borrowing equilibrium exists if the payofs when the poor agent borrows
are smaler than the payofs when he does not borrow. By setingq≡VMb thenecessary and suficient condition can be writen as:
qp −1≥ q41+14δ
. [3:
8
5]
Thus we have shown the folowing:
Proposition 1In the Rich Man- Poor Man scenario, an equilibrium without
borrowing exists if the folowing inequality holds.
qp −1≥ q41+14δ
.
In Figure 1 below the valuesðq,δÞthat satisfy (10) are those in the area above
the dashed line.
Because agent b is constrained,Mb<V=4, that is,q> 4. Note the folowing
features of this equilibrium:
1. A non borrowing equilibrium arises as a combination of patient agents and
the poor agent not being very poor: Ifδ= 1 (which is the most favorable case
for the existence of a non borrowing equilibrium), eq. [3.5] implies thatq
must be smaler than 13.09, that is, the initial wealth of the poor agent
should be at least 7% of the value of the prize.
2. In a non borrowing equilibrium, both agents spend less than if they are
unconstrained. For the poor agent, this is by definition, and for the rich
agent, it folows from the fact that, in equilibrium, strategies are strategic
complements. Thus hard financial constraints leadalagents to spend less.
4 5 6 7 8 9 100.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
q
delta
Figure 1:
9
Non borrowing equilibrium in the rich man-poor man scenario.
We now turn our atention to equilibrium with borrowing.
If an equilibrium with borrowing exists, expenses in the first period are
given by:
Ga= V 1+34δGb
2
s
−Gb, andGb= V 1+14δGa
2
s
−Ga. [3:6]
Solving eq. [3.6], we obtain
Ga=1+
3
4δ21+14δ
ð2+δÞ2 V, andGb=
1+34δ 1+14δ2
ð2+δÞ2 V. [3:7]
BothGaandGbare increasing inδ. Because forδ=0,Gb=V=4>Mb, agent b is
borrowing. The prize in case of borrowing for the rich agent is larger because
with certain probability, he wil be the only one surviving in the second period;
thus,Ga>Gb. The probabilities for each player of winning the contest in the first
period are:
pa= 1+
3
4δ
ð2+δÞ, andpb=
1+14δ
ð2+δÞ. [3:8]
Thus, the payof for the poor agent if he borrows is:
πBb=pbV−Gb+δpbV4 =
1+14δ3
ð2+δÞ2V. [3:9]
LetROiðGjÞthe best reply of agentiif the contest were played once and agents
were not constrained by monetary endowments. ForðGa,GbÞto be an equili-
brium we need to check first thatRObðGaÞ>Mb, because otherwise, givenGa
agentbcan best reply without borrowing and risking bankruptcy. Second, we
must show that the poor agent does not have an incentive to deviate and play
safe, that is, to not borrow and to playMb. BecauseRObðGaÞ= VGap −Ga, the
conditionRObðGaÞ>Mbcan be writen as:
Vð1+
3
4δÞ
ð2+δÞ 1+
1
4δ
s
−ð1+
3
4δÞ2ð1+14δÞ
ð2+δÞ2 V>Mb. [3:10]
Dividing byMband letingq=V=Mb, as before, we obtain
q ð1+
3
4δÞ
ð2+δÞ 1+
1
4δ
s
−ð1+
3
4δÞ2ð1+14δÞ
ð2+δÞ2
!
>1. [3:
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Given eq. [3.11], let us see that agent b does not have an incentive to deviate. If
he playsMbgiven that agentais playingGa, his payof wil be:
πNBb = MbGa+MbV−Mb+δ
V
4. [3:12]
Thus, he wil not deviate ifπNBb ≤πBbor, equivalently,
1
ð1+34δÞ2ð1+14δÞ
ð2+δÞ2 q+1
q−1+δ4q≤
ð1+14δÞ3
ð2+δÞ2q. [3:13]
We now prove that condition [3.13] implies condition [3.11] (as Figure 2 shows).
To see this, letFðqÞbe the function implicitly defined by
1
ð1+34δÞ2ð1+14δÞ
ð2+δÞ2 q+1
q−1+δ4q=
ð1+14δÞ3
ð2+δÞ2q, [3:14]
and letHðqÞbe the function implicitly defined by
qðð1+
3
4δÞ
ð2+δÞ 1+
1
4δ
s
−ð1+
3
4δÞ2ð1+14δÞ
ð2+δÞ2 Þ=1. [3:15]
Recal thatq≥4 and note thatFð4Þ=Hð4Þ= 0. Furthermore, there is noq≠4 such
that8FðqÞ=HðqÞ. Also note thatFð5Þ= 4.298 6 × 102andHð5Þ= 1. 604 8. Thus,
since both functions only cross at q = 4 andFð5Þ<Gð5Þ, thenFðqÞ<GðqÞfor al
q> 4, and this proves that condition [3.13] implies condition [3.11]. Summing up,
we have proved:
Proposition 2In the Rich Man-Poor Man scenario an equilibrium with borrowing
exists if the folowing inequality holds.
1
ð1+34δÞ2ð1+14δÞ
ð2+δÞ2 q+1
q−1+δ4q≤
ð1+14δÞ3
ð2+δÞ2q.
Conditions [3.13] and [3.11] look quite formidable but they are easy to picture in
Figure 2 below. The area below the doted line (which is very close to theδaxis)
corresponds to condition [3.11] and the area below the solid line corresponds to
condition [3.13]. Thus, for anyðq,δÞan equilibrium with borrowing exists in the
area below the solid line.
8The resolution of the system of equations using Maple given by eqs [3.14] and [3.15] and given
thatq≥4 and 0≤δ≤1 only have as a solutionq=4,δ
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=0.
Condition [3.13] says that, for a givenq, when the poor agent does not care much
about the future (i.e.,δis close to 0), he may risk bankruptcy. Alternatively,
givenδ, the poorer the agent is relative toV(i.e.qis high), the more likely he is
to prefer the risky strategy of borrowing resources. Thus, the borrowing equili-
brium arises as a combination of impatient agents and very few endowments in
hands of the poor agent. Interesting features of this equilibrium are:
1. Expenses of both players are larger than those in the one shot equilibrium.
Thus, in this equilibrium, agent a chalenges agent b with a large expense,
and agent b accepts the chalenge. This folows from the fact that the payof of
the rich agent is larger when the poor agent has a possibility of going bank-
rupt. Consequently, the rich agent is more aggressive in the first period. On the
one hand the rich agent is afected by the“Shadow Efect”where the antici-
pation of a future weaker contender makes strong players more aggressive
(see Brown and Milnor (2011). On the other hand, the poor agent is afected by
the Despair Efect which gives incentives to increase his expenses.
2. Whenqis very large (Mbis smal), an equilibrium with borrowing exists if
δ< .876. This implies that even under very low endowments the poor agent
might not like to embark upon borrowing unless she discounts heavily the
future. Thus the despair efect needs both a weak player and a relatively low
importance of the future.
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Figure 2:
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Borrowing equilibrium in the rich man-poor man scenario.
In Figure 3 we combine Figures 1 and 2. Note that for any pairðq,δÞbetween the
solid line and the dashed line in Figure 3, there is no SPNE in pure strategies.
Finaly, note that the equilibrium, whenever exists, is unique.
To close this section we present an example of non existence of equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Example 1Non-existence of Equilibrium in pure strategies.
Assume that the CSF is given by eq. [2.3]. LetV= 100,δ= 0.5, andMb= 10. The
best reply function for agentais:
Ga=
100Gbp −Gb if Gb≤Mb
137.5Gbp −Gb if Gb>Mb
(
The discontinuity for the rich agent is explained by the fact that for expenses of
the poor larger than her endowments he risks bankruptcy so payofs increase
discontinuously for the rich. For the poor agentGb= 100Gap −GaifGais such
that 100Gap −Ga≤Mb. That is, ifGa2½0, 1.27∪½78.73,∞Þ. For any otherGa, the
poor agent has two options: either he borrows or he does not borrow. If he
borrows, his expected payof is given by:
4 5 6 7 8 9 100.0
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Figure 3:
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Equilibrium in the rich man-poor man scenario.
πBb=p1bV− V 1+14δGa
s
+Ga+δp1bV4 . [3:16]
If he does not borrow, his expected payof is given by
πNBb = MbMb+GaV−Mb+δ
V
4.
Therefore, he wil borrow ifGais such thatπBb>πNBb which after some calcula-
tions amounts to
112.5Gap −Ga
112.5Gap 112.5− 112.5Ga
p +Ga> 1010 +Ga100 + 2.5.
That is, he wil borrow ifGa2½3.82, 26.18. Thus, the best reply of the poor agent is:
Gb=
100Gap −Ga if Ga2½0, 1.27∪½78.73,∞Þ
Mb=10 if Ga2½1, 27, 3.82∪½26.18, 78.73
112.5Gap −Ga if Ga2ð3.82, 26.18Þ
8><
>:
Thus the poor agent spends her endowments until the chalenge of the rich is so
large that he borrows. But if the rich spends more and more the risk of bank-
ruptcy becomes so large that the poor decides to get rid of this risk by spending
her endowments only. In Figure 4 we represent the best reply of the reach agent
Figure 4:
14
Non existence of equilibrium. Rich man-poor man scenario.
by a dashed line and the best reply of the poor agent by a solid line. Clearly,
there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Summing up, in the Rich man-Poor man scenario, the equilibrium can be of
two types: either the poor agent spends less than if financial constraints would
not exist (equilibrium without borrowing) or he risks bankruptcy (equilibrium
with borrowing). The first equilibrium occurs when concerns for the future are
important and the poor agent is not very poor. The second equilibrium exists in
the opposite circumstances and there both agents spend more than in the one
shot equilibrium. This result occurs because the rich agent has incentives to
force the poor agent to accept a large risk of bankruptcy. Thus, this equilibrium
is a predatory type of equilibrium, such as when the US forced the USSR in the
early 1980s into a large military expenditure that accelerated the demise of the
socialist state. For intermediate values of concern about the future and wealth of
the poor agent, an equilibrium might not exist.
4 Poor Man-Poor Man Scenario
In this section we study the case in which no agent can pay the expenses corre-
sponding to the one shot game out of his endowments:Ma<GandMb<G.For
simplicity, we focus here on the case in which both agents have identical endow-
ments, thus,Ma=Mb=M. This case is the polar case to that considered in the
previous section, where the asymmetry arising from endowments was maximal.
As in the previous section, there are equilibrium without and with borrow-
ing. We start with the former.
In a non borrowing equilibrium, given that the agents are identicaly con-
strained, both agents expend their entire resources in the first period. Both
agents survive in the second period; therefore, their continuation payof is
identical for both of them and equal toδV=4. Thus, payofs are
πNBiðM,MÞ=12V−M+
δV
4,i2fa,bg. [4:1]
If agentideviates and borrows, his continuation payof changes because he
faces bankruptcy with some probability. Thus, by playingGi>M,i’s payof is
πBiðGi,MÞ= GiGi+MV 1+
δ
4 −Gi. [4:2]
The most profitable deviation wil be to play the best reply ofiagainstM, that is
Gi= V1+δ4M
q
−M, giving to agenti
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a payof
πBiðGi,MÞ=
V1+δ4M
q
−M
V1+δ4M
q V 1+δ4 − V 1+
δ
4M
s
+M. [4:3]
An equilibrium with non borrowing wil exist if
πNBiðM,MÞ≥πBiðGi,MÞ, [4:4]
The above inequality can be writen as
1
2−
1
q≥1−2
1
q 1+
δ
4
s
+1q. [4:5]
Thus we have proved:
Proposition 3In the Poor Man-Poor Man scenario a non borrowing equilibrium
exists if the folowing inequality holds
1
2−
1
q≥1−2
1
q 1+
δ
4
s
+1q.
This inequality is pictured in Figure 5 below where the combining valuesðq,δÞ
that satisfy eq. [4.5] are those in the area above the dashed line.
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Figure 5:
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Non borrowing equilibrium in the poor man-poor man scenario.
We can see that, qualitatively, the boundary between the existence and the
non existence of a non borrowing is identical to the one in the rich man-poor
man scenario.
Now suppose that both agents borrow. In this case both are facing a
probability of bankruptcy in the second period. Therefore, with probabilitypi
agentiwil be the only one surviving in the game and his continuation payof
wil beδpiV.AtðGa,GbÞwithGi>M, the payof for agentiis
πBiðGa,GbÞ=piV−Gi+δpiV=pið1+δÞV−Gi. [4:6]
Letð^Ga,^GbÞbe
G^a=^Gb=^G=ð1+δÞV4 . [4:7]
Let us see thatð^Ga,^GbÞis an equilibrium with borrowing.
If agentideviates and does not borrow, that is, playsGi≤M, he wil not face
bankruptcy, and with probabilitypiðGi,^GÞhe wil be the only one surviving in
the game and obtainingV. With probability 1−piðGi,^GÞ, both agents wil
survive and agentiwil obtainV=4. Thus, if he deviates by playingGi≤M, his
payof wil be:
πNBiðG1i,^GÞ=piðGi,^GÞV−Gi+δðpiðGi,^GÞV+ð1−piðGi,^GÞÞV=4Þ
=piðGi,^GÞV 1+34δ −Gi+δV=4.
[4:8]
Let~Gibe the best reply toG^according toπNBi without considering the con-
straints. First, let us see that~Gi>M. Thus, the best possible deviation would be
to playM. Note that~Gi= 1+34δV^G
q
−^G. Using the value ofG^and that
V=M=q, we obtain that
1+34δ V^Gb
s
−^Gb>M [4:9]
is equivalent to
1+34δ
ð1+δÞ
4
s
−ð1+δÞ4 >
1
q. [4:10]
Becauseq> 4, and the left-hand side of eq. [4.10] is increasing inδ, the smalest
value of the left-hand side is 1=4. Thus, condition [4.10] always holds. Therefore,
we only need to check that deviating by non borrowing and playingMis not
profitable. If agentideviates and playsM
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he obtains
πNBiðM,^GÞ= Mð1+δÞV
4 +M
V 1+34δ −M+δV=4. [4:11]
The deviation is not profitable if
πBið^G,^GÞ≥πNBiðM,^GÞ. [4:12]
That is,
ð1+δÞV
4 ≥
M
ð1+δÞV
4 +M
V 1+34δ −M+δV=4, [4:13]
or equivalently,
1
4≥
ð1+34δÞ
ð1+δÞq
4 +1
−1q. [4:14]
Summing up,
Proposition 4In the Poor Man-Poor Man scenario a borrowing equilibrium exists
if the folowing inequality holds.
1
4≥
ð1+34δÞ
ð1+δÞq
4 +1
−1q.
This inequality is pictured in Figure 6 below where the combining valuesðq,δÞ
that satisfy [4.14] are those in the area below the solid line.
Again we see that the qualitative features of the boundary between the pairs
of (δ,qÞfor which a non borrowing equilibrium exists and those for which it
does not exists are identical to those in the rich man-poor man scenario.
Finaly, we show that there is no equilibrium with only one agent borrow-
ing. If an equilibrium with these characteristics exists, an agent expend their
entire resources in the first period and the other borrows and best reply toM.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that agent one is borrowing. LetðGa,MÞbe
such thatGais the best reply toMtaking into account that by borrowing agent
one is facing bankruptcy in the second period and agent two is not exposed to
bankruptcy, that is,Ga= V1+δ4M
q
−M. ForðGa,MÞto be an equilibrium,
agent one should not have incentives to deviate by non borrowing. Given the
analysis that we have done in the non borrowing equilibrium (reflected in eq.
[4.5]), that deviation wil not occur if and only if
1
2−
1
q≤1−2
1
q 1+
δ
4
s
+1q, withq=
V
M. [4:
18
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Furthermore, agent two should not have incentives to borrow. If he deviates and
borrows the best deviation wil be to play the best reply toGataking into
account that, by borrowing, if he looses the first contest he wil be bankrupted
in the second period but if he wins we wil be the unique contestant in the
future. His best deviation is to playGb= Vð1+δÞGa
p −Ga. Agent two wil not
deviate if and only ifπNBbðGa,MÞ≥πBbðGa,GbÞ. That is,
pbðGa,MÞV 1+34δ −M+δ
V
4≥pbðGa,GbÞVð1+δÞ−Gb. [4:16]
which rearranging terms and usingq=VMcan be writen as
1
qδ
2 1+14δ1q
q ≥ 1+34δ −2 ð1+δÞ 1+
1
4δ
1
q
s
−1q
 !
.
vuut [4:17]
In Figure 7 below we show that an equilibrium with this characteristics never
exist. The reason is that being both agents identical, diferent behaviors are not
individualy optimal. The area above the solid line corresponds to eq. [4.17] and
the area below the dash line corresponds to eq. [4.15]. Thus, eqs [4.17] and [4.15]
are not compatible.
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Borrowing equilibrium in the poor man-poor man scenario.
In Figure 8 we combine Figures 5 and 6. Note that for any pairðq,δÞbetween the
solid line and the dashed both equilibria can coexist; Example 2 below reflects
this possibility.
In this scenario, contrarily to what happens in the rich man-poor man
scenario, an equilibrium always exists. Moreover equilibrium is not unique:
There is a set of values ofðδ,qÞfor which both borrowing and non borrowing
equilibria coexists. Thus we see that a more equal endowment causes multi-
plicity of equilibria and the corresponding coordination problem.
Example 2Coexistence of borrowing and non borrowing equilibria.
Suppose thatV= 80, δ=1,M= 10 andq= 8. Both agents are constrained.
Because both agents are identical, their best reply functions are also identical.
Gi=
VGjp −Gj if Gj≤Mjand VGjp −Gj<Mi
Mi if Gj≤Mjand VGjp −Gj>Mi,andπNBi >πBi
Vð1+δ4ÞGj
q
−Gj if Gj≤Mjand VGjp −Gj>MiandπNBi <πBi
Mi if Gj>MjandπNBi >πBi
Vð1+δÞGjp −Gj if Gj>MjandπNBi <πBi
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
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An equilibrium with only one agent borrowing does not exist in the symmetric poor
man-poor man scenario.
where
πNBi = MiMi+GjV−Mi+δ
V
4, [4:18]
πBi=
V1+δ4Gj
q
−Gj
V1+δ4Gj
q V 1+δ4 − V 1+
δ
4Gj
s
+Gj, [4:19]
πNBi = MiMi+GjVð1+δÞ−Mi, [4:20]
πBi= Vð1+δÞGj
p −Gj
Vð1+δÞGjp Vð1+δÞ− Vð1+δÞGj
q
+Gj. [4:21]
In this example, for anyGj2½0, 10,πNBi >πBi, and for anyGj2ð10, 80we have
thatπNBi <πBi. The best reply functions of both agents are ploted in Figure 9.
We does have an equilibrium without borrowing in which both agents spend
10 and another equilibrium with borrowing where both agents spend 40. The
first equilibrium is not very robust because if, say, playerachooses 10 +ε(ε>0
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Equilibrium in the poor man-poor man scenario.
but stil very smal) the best reply of playerbis far from 10. However, this
equilibrium is robust if endowments vary a litle.
5 Conclusions and Further Extensions
In this paper, we presented a model of a two-period contest in which agents
have monetary endowments and may borrow money. We assume that the
inability to repay the loan carries the disappearance of this agent. We have
shown that relatively poor agents might take loans. Thus, handicapped agents
may take actions that endanger their survival in the long run but that, if
successful, substantialy reduce the handicap. We have caled this theDespair
Efectand we have shown that it exists in two polar scenarios: Rich Man-Poor
Man, in which an agent has unlimited endowments, and Poor Man-Poor Man in
which both agents are identical and have relatively smal endowments.
Many questions remain to further understand the issues raised in this paper.
We present four below.
1. More general CSF.
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Figure 9:
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Multiple equilibria. Poor man-poor man scenario.
A more general analysis which do not rely on the form of the CSF is
available under request. We show that our qualitative conclusions hold if
the CSF yields a best reply which is first increasing and then decreasing.
2. Other scenarios
We also have solved the model when both agents are diferent but con-
strained (i.e. they cannot pay their one shot Nash equilibrium expenses with
their endowments). Qualitatively, this analysis (available under request)
does not bring new insights to the those obtained in the Poor Man-Poor
Man scenario.
3. Entry in the second period
In our model, if a poor agent fals into bankruptcy, he leaves the entire field
to the other contestant. What if the disappearance of a contestant triggers the
entry of another contestant in the second period? In this case, the continua-
tion payof of the rich agent is alwaysδπ. If the poor agent borrows in the first
period, he faces bankruptcy in the second period; thus his payof wil be
πbðGa,GbÞ=pbðGa,GbÞV 1+δ4 −Gb. [5:1]
In an equilibrium with borrowing, the expenses in the first period are
Ga=ð1+
δ
4Þ
ð2+δ4Þ2
V;Gb=ð1+
δ
4Þ2
ð2+δ4Þ2
V, [5:2]
Note thatGais decreasing withδandGbis increasing withδ. The payof for
the poor agent is
πBb=
ð1+δ4Þ3
2+δ42V.
[5:3]
Finaly, note that the poor agent, once he has the opportunity to borrow,
wil expend more resources than the rich agent in the first period.9The
reason for this result is that, the rich agent does not have an incentive to
prey, so it decreases its expenses in the first period. However, equilibrium
occurs when actions are strategic substitutes for the poor agent. Thus, the
poor agent increases his expenses, and this leads to borrowing. In this case,
the shadow efect is not present, and the continuation value of the rich does
not change with the risky action of the poor agent. However, the Despair
Efect is stil present. The poor agent prefers the risky action to compete on
9
23
In this case, an equilibrium with borrowing always exists. A complete characterization of the
equilibrium using the Tulock CSF is available on request.
an equal footing in the first period, but because he is facing bankruptcy in
the second period, he is even more aggressive in the first period to reduce
the probability of bankruptcy. Because equilibrium occurs where actions are
strategic complements for the rich, this agent decreases his expenses and
the poor increases his expenses, which explains our results above.
4 More Periods
In our model, the world ends in the second period. This implies that there is
no strategic concern in the second period. This is odd because creates an
asymmetry between both periods. The way of fixing this problem would be a
model with an infinite horizon in which this asymmetry disappears. This
model is beyond the scope of the present paper. In any case our model can
be interpreted as one in which there is a fixed reward for survival in the
second period. In a dynamic model this would correspond to the second part
of the value function.
Other important assumptions are the existence of two agents only, a very
specific bankruptcy rule in which bankrupted agents disappear and a sty-
lized capital market where any loan can be obtained at the current interest
rate. Al of these assumptions raise important issues that must be considered
in further research. Finaly, this paper is totaly silent on questions of
welfare such as is it optimal to alow bankruptcies? or should contestant
firms be taxed/subsidized?
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